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Turkey and NATO
Abstract: This article takes stock of Turkey’s contributions to and benefits from 
the NATO in the context of an evolving strategic context and an adapting alliance. 
Turkey joined NATO in 1952 in the face of the then Soviet threats. As a strategi-
cally important Southern Flank nation it relieved the military pressure on Western 
Europe by tying down many Soviet divisions in the South and also by constituting 
a formidable barrier for the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact for their aspirations to 
have direct access to the Middle East. The dual- track approach of dialogue and 
deterrence/defence pursued in the years of detente of 1960s and 1970s suited Tur-
key, whose dialogue and economic cooperation with the Soviets and Warsaw Pact 
states increased. Events related to Cyprus and in particular President Johnson’s 
letter of 1964 implying that NATO would be unwilling to defend Turkey in case 
of a Soviet intervention resulting from Cyprus crisis, had a profound impact on 
Turkey’s strategic approach and pushed Turkey to re- evaluate its overall foreign 
relations and diversify its external ties by opening up to the Third World. The end 
of the Cold War was brought about, basically, as a result of the decline of commu-
nist ideology and failure of the Soviet economy. While maintaining the priority of 
the collective defence function, the Alliance adapted itself to the end of the Cold 
War by agreeing to additional missions in its new strategy. Turkey continued to 
give priority to the collective defence mission and made important contributions 
to Alliance’s new functions through a robust participation in its crisis management 
operations, to its partnership programs and in facing up the emerging security 
challenges. The crises that may affect the peace, security and stability in the North 
Atlantic area concern regions in Turkey’s vicinity such as Ukraine or the Middle 
East (Arab Spring related developments). In short, Turkey continues to contribute 
to and benefit from the new Alliance.
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Introduction
2012 was the 60th anniversary of Turkey’s joining NATO. Perhaps today, it would 
be a timely exercise to take stock of Turkey’s contributions to and benefits from the 
Atlantic Alliance. This cannot be a static exercise. International strategic context 
and the Alliance’s response to it have evolved since the Alliance’s establishment. It 
would, therefore make sense to dwell upon Turkey’s changing role within an evolv-
ing NATO from the Cold War days to the post- Cold War international environment.
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History
When Turkey was invited to join NATO in 1952 in the face of the then Soviet 
threats and pressures to its territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Alliance was 
merely three years old. In 1949, the Alliance was created through the signing of the 
North Atlantic Treaty (a.k.a. the Washington Treaty) by the United States, Canada 
and Western European countries to guarantee that the latter would not be over-
run by the Soviet tanks in the way that Eastern Europe was overrun and that 
they could focus on building their economies and healing their societies with the 
knowledge that the United States would come to their defense.
The vital role that the Alliance played for European security could not be better 
summarized than the words of James Goldgeier in his opinion piece published in 
the New York Times on the occasion of awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the 
European Union in October 2012:1
In awarding this year’s Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union, the Nobel 
committee quite rightly noted the EU’s critical role in Europe’s transformation 
‘from a Continent of war to a Continent of peace.’ But as Europeans celebrate what 
they have accomplished since World War II, they should not forget that without 
the United States and NATO, they could not have been successful. By creating eco-
nomic interdependence and then building deep political, cultural and societal ties, 
the Union enabled Western Europeans –and later Central and Eastern Europeans- 
to build prosperity. The horror of two world wars receded into the past. But pros-
perity is only possible when security is assured. And without the United States and 
NATO, peace would not have been possible.
This truism touches Turkey- NATO interaction in two distinct ways: 1) Turkey, 
though not being a member of the EU or its predecessor EEC2, has immensely 
benefited, as a European country, from the security guarantees provided by NATO 
and the United States. 2) At the same time Turkey, being a staunch ally often de-
scribed as ‘the anchor of the Southern Flank of the Alliance,’ was also a significant 
contributor to overall European security and NATO strategy. By tying down many 
Soviet divisions in the south, the Southern Flank was effectively relieving pressure 
on Central Europe. Furthermore, in addition to contributing to European Security, 
the Southern Flank was also a barrier for Soviet access to Middle Eastern Oil. By 
its very existence, NATO’s Southern Flank constituted a formidable barrier for the 
Soviets and the Warsaw Pact on their aspirations to have direct access to the Mid-
dle East and the Mediterranean sea. In short, Turkey benefited from its inclusion 
in NATO, and NATO has benefited from Turkey’s membership.
1 Goldgeier, James, “Don’t Forget NATO”, commentary in the New  York Times, 
16 October 2012. 
2 Turkey was interested in 1950’s to cooperate with the then EEC and has signed 
Association Agreement with the then EEC in 1963, has a Customs Union Agree-
ment with the EU, which went became effective in December 1995, and has started 
accession negotiations with the EU in 2005. 
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NATO’s Evolution
NATO’s history, in a sense, is a history of adaptation. Perhaps NATO owes the 
attribution of being ‘the most successful Alliance in history’ to its ability to adapt 
to the strategic circumstances. It is an interesting turn of events that major shifts 
in European strategic landscape have all been associated with events surround-
ing Berlin. If we can divide the life of the Alliance since its establishment roughly 
into three periods, all are ushered in, albeit symbolically, by events relevant to 
Berlin. It was, among other developments, the blockade of Berlin in 1948 that was 
instrumental in bringing about the creation of the Alliance in 1949. Then came the 
construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Though this development represented the 
height of the Cold War (following the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 in 
response to adhesion of then West Germany to NATO), it also signaled the begin-
ning of the period of detente or relaxation of tensions and the movement by the US 
from massive retaliation strategy to flexible response.3 Again in this period, in 
1966- 67 France withdrew from the integrated military structure of NATO.(Also as 
a consequence of this French withdrawal, NATO Headquarters moved from Paris 
to Brussels).The 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized the end of the Cold War 
and the beginning of the post- Cold War era.
Turkey and NATO in the Cold War period
Turkey enjoyed friendly relations with the Soviets in the years immediately pre-
ceding the establishment of the Republic. Turkish war of independence was sup-
ported by the new Soviet state in the aftermath of the First Word War since it was 
perceived as a contribution to the struggle against “imperialism”.4 This state of 
cordial relations also continued during the interwar period. During and after the 
Second World War, Stalin put pressure on Turkey, threatening its independence and 
territorial integrity requesting basing rights on Turkish Straits and certain Eastern 
provinces of Turkey. In 1945 it renounced the Turco- Russian Treaty of Friendship 
and Non- aggression of 1925. It was under these circumstances that eventually in 
1952, also after its contribution to the Korean War against “communist aggression”, 
Turkey (together with Greece), was invited to join NATO at the height of the Cold 
War. It was a staunch Ally at a critical geostrategic location. Turkish and Greek 
membership would mark the first successful enlargement of NATO.
Even though the Soviets withdrew their territorial claims from Turkey in 1953 
following the death of Stalin, tensions and crisis continued. This was especially 
true for their Middle East policies. Turkey had become the linchpin of the then 
‘containment’ policy. Containment on the western frontier was already achieved 
3 Wilson, John. (1998) “Chapter XII: Flexible Response”. Retrieved from http://
www.history.army.mil/books/Lineage/M- F/chapter12.htm. 
4 Shamsutdinov, A. M., A.  Şemsutdinov, and A.  Hasanoğlu.  Kurtuluş Savaşı 
Yıllarında Türkiye- Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri. Cumhuriyet, 2000.
656 Ali Oğuz Diriöz
through the creation of NATO. In the Middle East, containment was initially 
achieved through the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Soviets had perceived this as being 
squarely counter to all their strategic interests in the region. After the overthrow 
of the Hashemite royalty in Baghdad in 1958, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad 
Pact. It was substituted by CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) which included 
also Iran and Pakistan, further antagonizing the Soviets. CENTO survived until 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.5 Turkey was member of both NATO and 
CENTO, linking one to the other.
During this Cold War period, even though Turkey was a flank country, more 
often than not, it was involved in major security related developments. For ex-
ample in 1959 Jupiter missile systems were deployed in Turkey, provoking Soviet 
reaction.6 The downing of a US U- 2 spy plane in May 1960 led to accusations by 
the Soviets that Turkey allowed the use of its territory for aggressive actions. The 
Cuban missile crisis of 1962 resulted, among other things, in the removal of Jupiter 
missiles from Turkey.
Years of Détente
During the years of detente, Turkey’s security policy continued to be pursued 
within NATO framework and in harmony with the NATO’s “dual –track” approach 
of dialogue and deterrence/defense as elaborated in the Harmel Report.7 In the 
1960s and 1970s Turkey’s political dialogue and economic cooperation with the 
Soviets and Warsaw Pact states increased.
Events related to Cyprus had a profound impact on Turkey’s strategic approach. 
In particular President Johnson’s letter of 1964 implying that NATO would be un-
willing to defend Turkey in the case of a Soviet intervention resulting from the 
Cyprus crisis disappointed Turkey.8 Turkey re- evaluated its overall foreign rela-
tions and diversified its external ties by further opening up to the Islamic countries 
and the Third World.
Economic relations with the Soviets advanced to include major industrial pro-
jects such as refineries, steel mills as well as energy trade. Yet, some problems 
lingered on, such as the communist ideology broadcasts to Turkey from then East 
Berlin which was considered as subversive by Turkey, or some spying incidents.
5 Dimitrakis, P. (2009). British Diplomacy and the Decline of CENTO. Compara-
tive Strategy, 28 (4), pp. 317- 331.
6 Kamel, Ayhan. (n.d.) “İkinci DünyaSavaşı’nın Bitiminden Günümüze Ka-
dar Türk- Rus İlişkileri”. Retrieved from http://www.dispolitika.org.tr/dosyalar/
akamel_p.htm. 
7 Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance: Harmel Report. Brussels: NATO Infor-
mation Service, 1968. Print.
8 Bölükbaşı, Süha. “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, Middle Eastern Studies, 29.3 
(1993): 505. Academic Search Complete Web.
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Post- Cold War Period
NATO adopted itself to the end of the Cold War, initially through the adoption 
of its “New Strategic Concept” in 1991. (There are varying views on the causes of 
the end of the Cold War, but a most prevalent one is summarized by Joseph Nye 
as “the decline of communist ideology and the failure of the Soviet economy.”9 It 
should also be added that Ronald Reagan’s steadfast policies in confronting the 
Soviets and Gorbachev’s attempts for reform through “Perestroika” and “Glasnost” 
were also instrumental, but most argue that even in the absence of these latter fac-
tors, the Soviet ideology and economy would have continued to decline.) Furthermore 
on this occasion, for the first time NATO’s Strategic Concept was published as 
a public document. This transformation was continued in the next iterations of 
the strategy in 1999 and then in 2010 in the Lisbon Summit. The main shift was 
the acknowledgement that NATO did not consider any country as its adversary, 
extended the hand of friendship to its former adversaries and the risks and threats 
that the Alliance faced were multi- faceted and multi- directional. (This also implied 
that the Alliance capabilities, as well as its command and force structures had to be 
more mobile, flexible and deployable). In particular the “newer” strategy that was 
agreed at the Lisbon Summit of 2010 stipulated three core missions for the Atlan-
tic Alliance: 1) The enduring mission that always constituted the cornerstone of 
NATO: Collective defense and Article 5 commitments, 2) The promotion of securi-
ty through crisis management operations basically reflecting the Alliance’s readi-
ness to extend peace through strategic projection of security (such as its operations 
in the Balkans, Afghanistan, off the shore of Horn of Africa and in Libya), and 3) 
Cooperative approach to security meaning that NATO does not aspire to become a 
global cop, performing every security function but intends to cooperate with part-
ners in the face of converging global priorities and security crises, in short deep-
ening and widening its engagement with partners, as well as arms control. The 
new strategy also emphasizes that NATO will deter and defend against emerging 
security challenges such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery, terrorism, instability or conflict beyond NATO’s borders, cyber 
attacks and the disruption of the flow of energy supplies – where and when they 
threaten the security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.
With respect to the first task, collective defense, the Strategic Concept of the 
Alliance reiterates the Allies’ commitment to ensuring that NATO can deter and 
defend against any threat to Allied populations and territories and has the “ca-
pabilities” to do so. Actually, as far as collective defense was concerned, NATO’s 
motto has always been “deterrence and defense”. Deterrence comes before defense, 
because if deterrence is successful, you don’t have to defend, ie. you don’t have 
to fight. And the concept of deterrence has two main components: a) having the 
9 “Who Caused the End of the Cold War?”, Joseph Nye, The Huffington Post, 
18.3.2010.
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capabilities to do the job, and b) displaying the intention or the political will to use 
those capabilities (e.g. through exercises or public statements) so that deterrence is 
credible. This also means, in the broadest term, maintaining an appropriate mix of 
conventional, nuclear and missile defense forces. Collective defense will continue 
to require effective military forces that are deployable across Alliance territory 
and beyond.
In that context, despite the end of the Cold War, Turkey continued to attach 
importance to NATO’s Article 5 - collective defense- commitments. In this Turkey 
is not alone: for quite a number of Allies, particularly newer members of NATO, 
Article 5 continues to be extremely important and as stated above, its validity has 
strongly been re- confirmed in the new Strategic Concept.
As far as the collective defense related missions are concerned, Turkey has 
participated in the Alliance’s air policing over the Baltic States. This has been 
an important instance of Alliance solidarity, and by taking part in it with its 
interceptors, Turkey has demonstrated its preparedness to contribute to the de-
fense of its Allies while also relying on them to contribute to Turkey’s security. 
And indeed Allied solidarity with Turkey was demonstrated in connection with 
the crisis in Syria. All NATO countries condemned the downing of a Turkish 
reconnaissance plane in 2012 as well as the mortar shelling of Turkish town on 
the border with Syria. Most importantly, subsequent to those incidents, the Al-
liance took a decision to call for deployment of air defense Patriot missiles to 
Turkey to deter any possible missile attack from Syria and to contribute to the 
de- escalation of the crisis. Three Allies (US, Germany and Netherlands) took 
the decision to deploy Patriot missiles to Turkey, as an act of solidarity, and in 
January 2015, Spanish Patriots replaced the ones from the Netherlands. Perhaps 
it is important to note that Article 4 of the Washington Treaty has been invoked 
three times in the Alliance’s history, and only by Turkey. (First time in 2003 
during the second Iraq war, second and third times in 2012 in connection with 
Syria’s downing of an unarmed F- 4 reconnaissance fighter and mortar being 
fired to a town on the border.)
NATO continues to be important for Turkey for other reasons as well. The Al-
liance provides a transatlantic forum in which Turkey can find the opportunity 
to defend its security interest and shape international security together with its 
North American and European Allies. NATO also provides a unique integrated 
military structure at the disposal of the Allies.
Turning to the second task, the fact that the Allies undertook to promote secu-
rity through a spectrum of crisis management activities, missions or operations is 
a recognition that the Alliance’s security depends on events beyond its borders, 
and that crises and conflicts, failed states, and extremism elsewhere can pose a 
direct threat to Allies’ safety. The operations that NATO has undertaken or cur-
rently undertakes with the aim of contributing to peace, security and stability, 
without exception concern regions in Turkey’s vicinity and with which Turkey 
has strong links. Turkey provides significant support to all NATO- led operations 
and missions.
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Turkey’s contributions to NATO operations were estimated to amount to more 
than 3000 troops. The bulk of these troops are deployed as part of ISAF. That mis-
sion was completed at the end of 2014, Turkey is contributing to the follow- on 
mission of training, advising and assisting (Resolute Support Mission). Turkey also 
led two PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) in the Wardak and Jowzjan prov-
inces of Afghanistan, and as part of the Transition Plan, all PRTs have been handed 
over to the Afghan government. (This has also supported NATO’s comprehensive 
approach to crises encompassing not only military but also developmental and 
reconstruction dimensions). Hikmet Çetin, a former Speaker of Parliament and 
Foreign Minister of Turkey, served as NATO’s first Senior Civilian Representative 
in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2006. The “Ankara process” that brings together the 
Presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan under the auspices of the Turkish Pres-
ident, is recognized as an important contribution to building peaceful relations 
between the two countries. Turkey also contributed to Operation Unified Protec-
tor in Libya in 2011. It has been among steady contributors to Operation Active 
Endeavour - a maritime, anti- terrorism operation in the Mediterranean- in terms 
of assets and personnel. It should also not be forgotten that, immediately after the 
end of the Cold War, when a main challenge for the Alliance was to go “out of area 
or out of business”, Turkey was among the key countries advocating for NATO 
involvement in the Balkan crises (in early 1990s it was Bosnia) with a view to re-
ducing its destabilizing effect on overall European security. While outside NATO’s 
own responsibilities, Turkey also contributes to a number of UN and EU- led opera-
tions, including both military and police missions.
NATO’s third task, i.e. cooperative security, involves advancing partnerships. 
Actually partnerships are not by any means a new feature of the way NATO con-
ducts its business. However, the new strategy adopted in Lisbon foresees enhanced 
and deeper engagement with the wider world with old and new partners. There is 
a clear recognition in NATO’s Strategic Concept that NATO’s relations with other 
nations and international organizations within an expanded network of partner-
ships is essential for Euro- Atlantic and wider international security and stabil-
ity. NATO has a variety of partnership frameworks: Russia, Ukraine and Georgia 
having their distinct fora; PFP (Partnership for Peace, for former Soviet Union 
and Warsaw Pact and Eastern/Southeastern European countries); Mediterranean 
Dialogue for Middle East and North Africa countries; ICI (Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative) for most Gulf states; Operational Partners such as Afghanistan and Iraq; 
and finally Partners Across the Globe such as Japan, South Korea, New Zealand 
and Australia. Since dealing with global security concerns such as terrorism, pro-
liferation, cyber attacks and energy security require cooperative responses, NATO, 
through its partnership policies, among other things, aims at developing with the 
desiring partners, a capability of working together. In particular, the Smart Defense 
and Connected Forces Initiatives launched at NATO’s Chicago Summit of May 
2012 (and which is explained below) require robust partner involvement.  
NATO’s growing partnerships are also of interest to Turkey. Turkey has estab-
lished cooperative relations with countries in its region over the past decades. It 
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has also led multilateral cooperative regional efforts such as the establishment of 
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation framework. These bilateral and multilateral 
relations overlap, to a great degree, with the wide network of partnerships that 
NATO has built, and can be seen as mutually reinforcing. An example of Turkey’s 
role with respect to NATO’s partnership is a Turkish initiative that resulted in the 
creation of the “Multinational Peace Force South- East Europe”, and the subsequent 
deployment of the South East European Brigade (SEEBRIG) as part of the NATO- 
led force in Afghanistan in the first half of 2006.
Turkey also acts as a mentor to NATO’s partners, particularly those in the Bal-
kans, Caucasus and Central Asia, by helping them to make use of the political 
dialogue and practical defense cooperation programs that the Alliance has on offer. 
Among other initiatives, Turkey runs a Partnership for Peace Training Center as 
well as a Center of Excellence on Defense Against Terrorism in Ankara, which are 
open to partners.
The 2010 Lisbon Summit decisions and April 2011 Berlin Foreign Ministers con-
clusions on NATO’s partnerships indeed were quite forward leaning.10 These deci-
sions, however, could not be fully developed and implemented because of Turkey’s 
cooling relations with Israel, a Mediterranean Dialogue partner, due to the Mavi 
Marmara incident.11 For the same reason, partnership aspects of NATO’s Chicago 
Summit’s decisions, in particular on Smart Defense and Connected Forces Initia-
tive, also were slow in being developed. Earlier signs of improvement in mending 
the relations between the two countries (during President Obama’s visit to Israel)12 
have once again struck an all time low following the November 2014 incidents 
at the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Had relations started to mend, the expecta-
tion was to positively influence also the implementation of NATO’s partnership 
policies, recognizing that other divergences also may exist between many allies on 
some other aspects of partnerships.
Turkey has also been an avid supporter of NATO’s open door policy. According 
to Turkey, the accession of new members has helped create a continuous space 
of democracy and security in Europe, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. It also 
brought new Allies in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood and thereby helped to 
consolidate its security. NATO’s enlargement may well continue in the future, not 
least including further invitations to states in the Balkans.
10 Moore, Rebecca R. “Lisbon and the Evolution of NATO’s New Partnership 
Policy”, Perceptions  (2012): 55. Retrieved from http://sam.gov.tr/tr/wp- content/up-
loads/2012/07/perceptions_Spring_2012.pdf#page=59. 
11 Özalp, Güven. (2012). “Türkiye’den İsrail’e NATO Vetosu”. Milliyet Newspaper. 
Retrieved from http://dunya.milliyet.com.tr/turkiye- den- israil- e- nato- vetosu/du-
nya/dunyadetay/23.04.2012/1531613/default.htm. 
12 Landler, Jodi Rudoren. “At YadVashem in Israel, Obama Urges Action 
Against Racism”,  The New  York Times. Web.  25 Mar.  2013. http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/03/23/world/middleeast/president- obama- israel.html?pagewanted=all. 
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Turkey also expresses active interest in supporting an Alliance role in the face 
of emerging security challenges, such as terrorism, energy security, maritime se-
curity, cyber security, climate change and proliferation.13 For example, regarding 
energy security, Turkey plays an important role as an energy corridor for Europe 
and can help diversify energy supply routes into the territory of several Allies. As 
far as ballistic missile proliferation is concerned, Turkey’s decision to host a radar 
constitutes an important element of NATO’s missile defense capability (which has 
been agreed at the Lisbon Summit as a mission for the Alliance) which will signifi-
cantly contribute to NATO’s capability to provide protection to Alliance territory, 
populations and forces against the growing threat posed by the proliferation of 
ballistic missiles.
Current NATO Issues
A most acute development that affects the way NATO performs its tasks is the 
current economic crisis. The effects of the economic crisis on the Allies’ govern-
ment budgets and therefore on their defense spending have been severe. This has 
resulted in the cancellation or delays of major equipment projects, reductions in 
training, and cuts in personnel. Ongoing operations are also draining funds away 
from modernization and transformation budgets. At the same time, the defense 
spending gap between the United States and the European Allies has continued to 
increase although defense spending in the US is also set to decline, in particular as 
a result of the sequestration. The Libya operation had shown that European Allies 
could take the lead, but it depended on essential support provided by the United 
States. Many in the Alliance argue that if the Allies, in Europe in particular, do not 
act to counter this imbalance, NATO’s pre- eminent role as a provider of security 
and performing its tasks could be jeopardized.14 In 2011, then US Secretary of De-
fense Robert Gates also emphasized this point in his valedictory speech.15 NATO 
Summit of September 2014 in Wales has, on paper, forged an agreement among 
Allies, “to reverse the trend of declining defence budget”16.
13 Gönül, Vecdi. “Turkey- NATO Relations and NATO’s Strategic Concept”,  Turk-
ish Policy Quarterly 9.1 (2010): 15- 21. Turkish Policy Quarterly. Web. http://www.
turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2010- 01- tpq/15- 21.pdf. 
14 NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  NATO after ISAF – Staying Suc-
cessful Together, p.  2, Feb.  2013. Web. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opin-
ions_94321.htm. 
15 Paris, Thom Shanker And Steven Erlanger; Thom Shanker Reported From Brus-
sels, And Steven Erlanger From Paris. Stephen Castle Contributed Reporting From 
Brussels, Elisabeth Bumiller From Washington, And Romain Parlier From. “Blunt 
U.S. Warning Reveals Deep Strains in NATO”, The New York Times. 11 June 2011. Web 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/europe/11nato.html?pagewanted=all. 
16 September 2014 NATO Summmit Declaration, paragraph 14. 
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As a result, NATO has been developing a more focused, cooperative approach 
to the development of military capabilities. This seems to be based on the belief 
that the challenges facing the international system - both security and economic-
 require concerted and deliberate action. They argue that security risks do not 
simply or conveniently disappear due to a financial crisis. Nations must continue 
to guarantee the security of their citizens, even in times of austerity.17
NATO’s approach to this has been Smart Defense. According to the Alliance, 
Smart Defense means prioritizing, specializing and adopting more multinational 
approaches to provide capabilities needed to perform its tasks. They will need to 
focus on spending their defense budgets more wisely and to make more efficient 
use of their resources. Smart Defense should bring greater efficiency by delivering 
many capabilities more cost- effectively through cooperation. Turkey has indicated 
a strong interest in the Smart Defense initiative and is participating in quite a num-
ber of projects either as lead nation or participating nation.18
Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) is another aspect of Chicago Summit’s Defense 
Package (Chicago Defense Package) for making the Alliance’s forces and capabili-
ties suitable for the tasks of future through NATO Forces 2020.19 The operational 
tempo of the Alliance forces, which is considered to be quite high due to the opera-
tion of ISAF in Afghanistan, is expected to be significantly reduced after the end of 
2014 when the mission of these forces are expected to change from combat to train, 
assist and advise.20 This would, in turn, lead to a reduction of activities that could 
improve the Allied nations’ (and partners’ too) forces’ ability to work together 
and enhance interoperability. Therefore, the CFI aims at making up for this short-
coming through an increased focus on exercises (especially those involving NATO 
Response Forces – NRF, not least because it would also allow US forces’ rotational 
participation and presence in Europe), training, education and use of technology. 
Turkey, like all other Allies supports this initiative as the Alliance moves from 
operational engagement to operational readiness.
An important issue for the Alliance is managing its relations with the European 
Union. This is relevant for most aspects of NATO’s work ranging from partnership 
to comprehensive approach to crisis management as well as capability develop-
ment. 22 NATO countries are also members of the European Union. It, therefore, 
17 NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO after ISAF – Staying Successful 
Together, p., 2 Feb. 2013. Web. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_94321.
htm. 
18 NATO Review interview with Turkish Minister of Defense İsmet Yılmaz, pub-
lished on June 6, 2012.
19 NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  Summit Declaration on Defense 
Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020. N.p., 20 May 2012. Web.http://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm?mode=pressrelease. 
20 NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  ISAF Defense Ministers Prepare for 
Transition Milestone. p., 22 Feb.  2013. Web. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
news_98737.htm. 
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makes sense for the two organizations to cooperate in areas of common interest to 
them. After all, they have one set of forces and for that matter, one set of budgets. 
But because of the Cyprus issue and its membership in the EU, there are institu-
tional difficulties in fully developing these relations. Turkey, while recognizing the 
importance of this indispensable partnership between the two institutions, insists 
that it should be conducted on the basis of the existing agreed framework. At the 
‘political level’ it seems that the only long- term solution would come from reach-
ing an understanding on the Cyprus issue. At the ‘operational level’, it seems that 
coordination and cooperation between NATO and the EU in theaters where they 
are involved together (such as Afghanistan, Kosova, counter- piracy off the coast 
of Somalia) modus operandis are working at a satisfactory level. In the area of 
‘capability development’ it is important to avoid duplication and provide comple-
mentarity and coherence between the efforts of the two organizations, especially 
at a time when both have launched similar initiatives in this area (NATO’s Smart 
Defense and EU’s Pooling and Sharing). A NATO- EU Capability Group already ex-
ists to deal with these aspects.21
As had been mentioned earlier, NATO started to transform its forces and struc-
tures in accordance with the requirements of the new strategic environment which 
called for more mobility, flexibility and deployability. NATO’s command structure, 
which constitutes a unique feature of NATO and the backbone of its integrated 
military structure, was recently reformed with these considerations in mind. In-
deed the Command Structure Reform, agreed by NATO Defense Ministers in June 
2011, reduced the number of NATO’s major Headquarters from 11 to 7.22 This re-
form seems to have confirmed İzmir as an important location among NATO’S mili-
tary headquarters. In a way, with the new Land Component Command in İzmir, 
the Alliance keeps a major NATO flag on Turkish territory in a domain for which 
Turkey has a traditional affinity, expertise and potential.
NATO’s strategic partnership with Russia has a key importance in its partner-
ship policies and structures. NATO- Russia Council (NRC) was established at the 
NATO- Russia Summit in Rome on 28 May 2002 by the Declaration on “NATO- 
Russia Relations: a New Quality”. Despite the tensions of the Cold War period, 
in the post- Cold War era, Turco- Russian relations and friendship developed at a 
rapid pace. For example, today Russia is Turkey’s number 2 trading partner. Thus, 
Turkey supports engagement with Russia policy of the Alliance enthusiastically.23
Despite this positive trend, first the crisis with Georgia in 2008 was treated 
as a strategic challenge by NATO countries. NATO- Russia relations, which were 
21 NATO EU Strategic Partnership, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/top-
ics_49217.htm, updated 29 Oct. 2012.
22 BBC News Europe, Viewpoint: How to make Nato leaner, meaner and cheaper By 
Edgar Buckley Former Assistant Secretary- General of NATO, 22 Nov. 2010, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- europe- 11812560. 
23 “Turkey’s Relations with NATO”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa. 
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increasingly tense after the 2008 crisis in Georgia. Just as there was a move towards 
“reset” in particular in US- Russian relations, the crisis in Ukraine came about. The 
NATO, in its Declaration of Wales Summit of September 2014 “condemned in the 
strongest terms Russia’s escalating and illegal military intervention in Ukraine and 
demanded that Russia stop and withdraw its forces from inside Ukraine and along 
the Ukrainian border”. It stated that “this violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity was a serious breach of international law and a major chal-
lenge to Euro- Atlantic security. For more than two decades, NATO had strived to 
build a partnership with Russia, including through the mechanism of the NATO- 
Russia Council”. Nevertheless, it went on saying that they “continue to believe 
that a partnership between NATO and Russia based on respect for international 
law would be of strategic value” and they “continued to aspire to a cooperative, 
constructive relationship with Russia”, “As a result, NATO’s decision to suspend 
all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia remains 
in place. Political channels of communication, however, remain open”. On the op-
erational side, the Alliance approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan, “in order 
to ensure that the Alliance was ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new 
security challenges.” The Crisis in Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 brought the NATO- 
Russia relations at their lowest since the end of the Cold War. The NATO Secretary 
General, in his keynote speech at the opening of Munich Security Conference on 6 
February 2015 said the efforts by Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande to find 
a peaceful solution to the Ukraine crisis are ‘important and urgent”. He said there 
was no contradiction between defence and dialogue. “A stong NATO is essential 
if we are to engage Russia with confidence. A constructive NATO- Russia rela-
tionship would benefit the Euro- Atlantic community and the entire international 
order, but international rules must be respected – not rewritten and certainly not 
violated.” 
NATO also seems to be watching closely the evolution of the Arab Spring. With 
its insights; geographical, historic and cultural affinity with the region and its 
growing influence Turkey can make an important contribution to strengthening 
NATO’s relations with the region. NATO’s ambition for the region, for the time 
being, seems to be to consider how to contribute in the security field to the tran-
sition efforts of its partners in areas in which it has expertise, such as defense 
transformation, modernization and capacity development; civil- military relations; 
and security sector reform.24 Yet, as the crisis in Syria and as a result of that in Iraq 
has transformed into a serious security threat by the radical elements, the Alli-
ance again, in its Wales Summit Declaration of September 2014 has also focused 
on this issue by stating that they are deeply concerned by the growing instability 
and mounting transnational and multi- dimensional threats across the Middle East 
and North Africa region; that they will continue to closely monitor the situation 
24 International Herald Tribune Op- ed contributor: Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
“NATO and the Arab Spring”, May 31, 2011.
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and explore options for possible NATO assistance to bilateral and international 
efforts to promote stability and contribute to the response to the growing crisis 
in, and threats from, the Middle East region. They’ve stressed that the so- called Is-
lamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (also sometimes called the self proclaimed 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) poses a grave threat to the Iraqi people, to the 
Syrian people, to the wider region, and to our nations, and if the security of any 
Ally was threatened, they will not hesitate to take all necessary steps to ensure 
their collective defense. 
The economic crisis referred to above and the burden sharing issue that it has 
further exposed is closely linked to the importance of maintaining the Transat-
lantic Relations. Turkey has always been considered a staunch ally, both during 
the Cold War and in the Post- Cold War period.25 During the Cold War period, this 
was more due to its exposed geostrategic position as a flank country. In the post 
Cold War era, it seems to be due to the fact that most developments receiving the 
Alliance’s and US’s strategic attention are taking place in the vicinity of Turkey 
and therefore adding more strategic convergence, vision and focus to their inter-
est. The so- called US pivoting to the Middle East and Asia- Pacific region has not 
weakened, but on the contrary reinforced this convergence (Actually, US has also 
declared that its commitment to security of Europe continues, that it sees Europe 
as a security provider and not as a security consumer.26 Furthermore, whatever 
US engage in Asia- Pacific region’s security is also to the benefit of Europe).Need-
less to say transatlantic relations are not merely confined to the security domain. 
Transatlantic trade talks are important item on the agenda between the EU and the 
US. Whether defense trade issue will come within the scope of these broader trade 
talks and the extent of synchronization with NATO remains to be seen. Obviously 
Turkey would have a keen interest in these developments. Turkey is particularly 
concerned to be left out of any Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) as it is not a member of the EU, and its Customs Union with the EU may 
not automatically apply to 3rd party countries. On a separate note on security is-
sue, as far as burden sharing issue is concerned qualitative aspects of contribution 
to Allied security would be as important as the quantifiable indicators such as 
defense spending as percentage of GDP, major defense investments as percentage 
of Defense Budget, deployability and sustainability of forces. Qualitative aspects 
of burden sharing also include soft power that Allies provide. Turkey, as men-
tioned above, with its geographic, historic, cultural and economic links with the 
areas of strategic interest for Alliance stands out as such a source of soft power. 
25 “Turkey and the West,” By Bruce R.  Kuniholm, Foreign Affairs, published by 
the Council on Foreign Relations, Spring 1991.
26 “THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK: AN ESSENTIAL PART OF EUROPE’S GLOBAL 
STRATEGY”, By Erik Brattberg. Published 12 March 2013.The Swedish Institute for 
International Affairs.
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This has been manifest for example with Turkish role in NATO’s involvement in 
Afghanistan.27
In conclusion, the words of NATO’s former Secretary General Anders Fogh Ras-
mussen, in a speech delivered in Ankara in February 2012, succinctly summarizes 
the main tenets of Turkey’s involvement within NATO; “Turkey has been a vital 
member of NATO for 60 years. Many things have changed in that time. But our 
commitment to each other has not. Turkey plays an important role in our opera-
tions and we are particularly grateful for your steadfast commitment to our ISAF 
operation. Turkey has an important voice in our decisions. And Turkey has a vital 
part to play in shaping our partnerships. Together, we are the most successful mili-
tary Alliance in the world. So, Turkey has done very much for NATO. It has shown 
its commitment to security, stability and solidarity time and again. But NATO has 
done a lot and does a lot for Turkey. First, Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty is 
still the world’s most powerful insurance policy. So, the security each Ally gets 
out is about more than just the security you contribute. NATO remains the only 
structured forum that brings together North America and Europe. It is a dynamic 
and unique forum for Allied consultations on both the political and the military 
dimensions of security. All decisions are taken by consensus. So Turkey’s voice 
matters… For sixty years Turkey has been a part of the transatlantic family. Turkey 
gains what all the family members gain – not just the promotion of our interests, 
but also the protection of our values”.
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